Abstract. In many private set operations, a set is represented by a polynomial over a ring Zσ for a composite integer σ, where Zσ is the message space of some additive homomorphic encryption. While it is useful for implementing set operations with polynomial additions and multiplications, a polynomial representation has a limitation due to the hardness of polynomial factorizations over Zσ. That is, it is hard to recover a corresponding set from a resulting polynomial over Zσ if σ is not a prime. In this paper, we propose a new representation of a set by a polynomial over Zσ, in which σ is a composite integer with known factorization but a corresponding set can be efficiently recovered from a polynomial except negligible probability. Note that Zσ [x] is not a unique factorization domain, so a polynomial may be written as a product of linear factors in several ways. To exclude irrelevant linear factors, we introduce a special encoding function which supports early abort strategy. As a result, our representation can be efficiently inverted by computing all the linear factors of a polynomial in Zσ[x] whose root locates in the image of encoding function. When we consider group decryption as in most private set operation protocols, inverting polynomial representations should be done without a single party possessing a factorization of σ. This is very hard for Paillier's encryption whose message space is ZN with unknown factorization of N . Instead, we detour this problem by using Naccache-Stern encryption with message space Zσ where σ is a smooth integer with public factorization. As an application of our representation, we obtain a constant round privacy-preserving set union protocol. Our construction improves the complexity than the previous without honest majority assumption. It can be also used for constant round multi-set union protocol and private set intersection protocol even when decryptors do not possess a superset of the resulting set.
Introduction
Privacy-preserving set operations (PPSO) are to compute set operations of participants' dataset without revealing any information other than the result. There has been many proposals to construct PPSO protocols with various techniques such as general MPC [11, 1] , polynomial representations [8, 15, 9, 22, 12] , pseudorandom functions [13] , and blind RSA signatures [6, 5] . While the last two techniques are hard to be generalized into multi-party protocols, polynomial representations combining with Additive Homomorphic Encryption (AHE) schemes enable us to have multi-party PPSO protocols for various operations, including set intersection [15, 9, 22] , (over-)threshold set union [15] , element reduction [15] and so on. Among these constructions, set intersection protocols run in a number of rounds, but others run in linear of the number of participants.
Let us focus on privacy-preserving set union protocols. There are two obstacles to construct constant round privacy-preserving multi-party set union protocols based on polynomial representations with AHEs. First, in the polynomial representations set union corresponds to polynomial multiplication, which is not supported by an AHE in constant rounds. Second, to recover the union set from the resulting polynomial, we need a root finding algorithm of a polynomial over Z σ , where Z σ is the message space of AHE.
Z σ , in which a corresponding set can be efficiently recovered from a polynomial except non-negligible probability when the factorization of σ is given. For a given polynomial
, if the factorization of σ is given, one can obtain all roots of f in Z q i for each i by exploiting a polynomial factorization algorithm over a finite field Z q i [28] . By reassembling the roots of f in Z σ using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), we can obtain all the candidates. However, the number amounts to d¯ , which is exponential in the size of the universe.
We introduce a special encoding function ι to exclude irrelevant candidates efficiently. For a polynomial f = d i=1 (x − ι(s i )) ∈ Z σ [x], our encoding function abort most irrelevant candidates without d¯ CRT computations, by giving a certain relation among roots of f in Z q j [x] and roots of f in Z q j+1 [x] . As a result, our encoding function enables us to efficiently recover all the roots of f with negligible failure probability if they are in the image of ι. 2 τN ρN ) ≥ 1 n: the number of participants, k: the maximum size of sets τN , τ p , τp: the size of modulus N for Paillier encryption scheme or NS encryption scheme, the size p of representing domain, the order p of a cyclic group for Pedersen commitment scheme, respectively ρN , ρ p , ρp: modular multiplication cost of modulus N for Paillier encryption scheme or NS encryption scheme, p for the size of representing domain, p for the order of a cyclic group for Pedersen commitment scheme, respectively
As an application of our new representation, combining with Naccache-Stern (NS) AHE scheme which is the factorization of the size σ of message space is public, we obtain an efficient constant round privacy-preserving set union protocol without honest majority assumption. In Table 1 1 , we compare our set union protocols with the previous main results.
Remark that we can easily extend our set union protocol to multi-set union protocol by encoding the same elements differently. We describe details in Section 4.4. The resulting multi-set union protocol is little bit slower than a previous result [12] , but the public key size of the utilized encryption in our protocol is O(1), while that of previous work is O(d) for the size d multi-set union.
We also consider transforming previous privacy-preserving set intersection protocol in [15] into a protocol even when decryptors do not possess a superset of the resulting set.
Related Work: There are a few researches to construct a privacy-preserving multiparty set and multi-set union protocol. Kissner and Song [15] provided a multi-party set and multi-set union protocol in the honest-but-curious case. Frikken [9] and Sand and Shen [22] presented more efficient multi-party set union protocols and multi-set union protocols in the malicious case, respectively. However, these protocols exploit a mix-net protocol [10] instead of polynomial factorization algorithm, which runs in linear of the number of the number of corrupted players, and hence it cannot have constant round complexity.
Recently, Seo et al. [23] proposed constant round multi-party set union protocols by representing elements in a set as poles of a rational function. But, their constructions hire a secret sharing technique for supporting privacy-preserving multiplications, thus requires an honest majority assumption for security and computational and communicational complexity heavier than previous results.
In case of privacy-preserving multi-set union protocols, Hong et al. [12] proposed a protocol based on El Gamal encryption schemes defined over an extension field F q κ where κ is larger than nk where n is the number of participants and k is the size of datasets. But it suffer from the public key size of the utilized encryption, since the extension degree κ of extension field has to be larger than d for the size d multi-set union and hence the public key size is O(d).
Outline of the Paper: In Section 2 we look into some components of our privacypreserving set union protocol, polynomial factorization algorithm, polynomial representation, and AHE schemes. We provide our new polynomial representation that enables us to uniquely factorize a polynomial satisfying some criteria in Section 3. Section 4 provides some privacy-preserving set operation protocols based on our polynomial representation.
Preliminaries
In this section, we look into polynomial representations of a set for PPSO and introduce efficient AHE schemes utilized in PPSO protocols supporting polynomial operations between encrypted polynomials. Then, we briefly look into root finding algorithms over finite fields and message spaces of AHE scheme for applying to recover a set from a polynomial in polynomial representation.
Throughout this paper, for a polynomial
1 Note that the communication and computational complexity in Table 1 of [23] are for one participant.
Polynomial Representation of a Set
Let R be a commutative ring with unity and S be a subset of R. We may represent a set S by a polynomial or a rational function over R.
Polynomial Representation In some previous works [8, 15, 9, 12, 23] , a set S can be represented by a polynomial f S (x) ∈ R[x] whose roots are the elements of S. That is,
This representation gives the following relation:
for some polynomial u(x) ∈ R[x] and hence the roots of a polynomial f S (x) + f S (x) are the elements of S ∩ S with overwhelming probability. Also, the roots of f S (x) · f S (x) are the elements of S ∪ S as multi-sets.
Rational function Representation Recently, Seo et al. [23] introduced a novel representation of a set S ⊂ R by a rational function F S over R whose poles consist of the elements of S. That is,
.
This representation provides the following relation:
for some polynomial u(x) ∈ R[x] which is relatively prime to lcm(f S (x), f S (x)). Hence the poles of F S (x) + F S (x) are exactly the roots of lcm(f S (x), f S (x)), which are the elements of S ∪ S as sets, not multi-sets. This rational function is represented again by an infinite formal power series, so called a reversed Laurent series (RLS), in [23] .
Additive Homomorphic Encryption
Let us consider a commutative ring R with unity and a R-module G where r · g := g r for r ∈ R and g ∈ G. Let Enc pk : R → G be a public key encryption under the public key pk. We can define a public key encryption for
as follows:
Assume Enc pk is an AHE such that
x i , we can induce homomorphic properties of E as follows: -Polynomial addition: Given E pk (f ) and E pk (g), it is possible to compute
There are several efficient AHE schemes [19] [20] [21] 2] : Under the assumption that factoring N = p 2 q is hard, Okamoto and Uchiyama [20] proposed a scheme with R = Z p and G = Z N , in which the order p of the message space R is hidden. With the decisional composite residuosity assumption, Paillier [21] scheme has R = Z N and G = Z N 2 for N = pq, in which the size of message space is a hard-to-factor composite integer N . Naccache and Stern [19] proposed a scheme with R = Z σ and G = Z N under the higher residue assumption, where N = pq is a hard-to-factor integer and σ is a product of small primes dividing φ(N ).
In the previous two schemes, it is hard to find the roots of a polynomial in R[x] without knowing a secret key. While, in the Naccache-Stern (NS) scheme, it may be possible to compute some roots of a polynomial in Z σ [x] since the factorization of σ is public. But Z σ [x] is not a unique factorization domain (UFD) and so the number of roots of f ∈ Z σ [x] can be larger than the deg f . In fact, if
, then the number of candidates of roots of f is d¯ where¯ is the number of prime factors of σ. We will use the NS scheme by introducing a method to efficiently recover all the roots of f ∈ Z σ [x] satisfying some criterion.
Root Finding Algorithms
When R is a finite field F q , we have several efficient root finding algorithms in R [x] . Using a square-free decomposition and the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm [29, Section 14.4 ], a polynomial of degree d over a field F q is factored in O(d 2 log q) field operations. Recently, it has been improved using fast arithmetic into O(d 1.5+o (1) ) field operations by Umans [28] . However, as mentioned above, there is no efficient AHE whose message space is a finite field F q with public q.
Consider R = Z σ , a message space of NS encryption scheme for σ = ¯ j=1 q j with distinct primes q j 's. Let f ∈ Z σ [x] be a polynomial of degree d, which is a product of
is not a UFD, it is still very hard to recover the exact (x − s i )'s from the polynomial f . However, since the factors of σ are known, one can apply Umans' polynomial factorization algorithm to find all roots of f mod q j with O(d 1.5 ) field operations in Z q j for each j. Then one performs the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), which takes O(log 2 σ) bit operations for each candidate of roots. Since each polynomial f mod q j has about d distinct roots, there exist about d¯ candidates of roots of f over Z σ . Hence the total complexity becomes O(¯ d 1.5 log 2 q j + d¯ log 2 σ) bit operations. However, one can still not determine the exact s i 's since it has no criteria to distinguish the exact s i 's from candidates.
In this paper, we can recover all the exact roots of f satisfying some criteria in O(¯ d 1.5 log 2 q j ) bit operations using early abort technique. The details are in Section 3.
Invertible Polynomial Representation
Let f S (x) ∈ Z σ [x] be a polynomial, all of whose roots are the elements in S ⊆ Z σ for a composite σ = ¯ j=1 q j with distinct primes q j 's. Since Z σ [x] is not a UFD, it is impossible to recover the exact S from the polynomial f S in almost all cases. In this section, we provide our new polynomial representation that enables us to efficiently recover the exact set from the polynomial represented by our suggestion.
Throughout this section, let d 0 = max{d, log N }, where N is the modulus of NS encryption scheme, and τ = 1 3 (log d + 2 log d 0 ). We assume that q j 's are (3τ + 1)-bit distinct primes and let U ⊆ {0, 1} 3ατ be the universe for ≤¯ and 0 < α < 1. The proper size of parameters will be determined later by analyzing complexity of our representation and our set union protocol.
Focus on the fact that the factorization of σ is public. Using this fact, given a polynomial
for a set S = {s 1 , . . . , s d }, one can obtain all roots of f mod q j for each j, by applying Umans' polynomial factorization algorithm over a finite field Z q j . To recover S, one can perform CRT computation for obtaining less than d¯ candidates of roots of f over Z σ . In general, however, the number of roots of f over Z σ is larger than the deg f and there is no criteria to determine the exact set S. To remove irrelevant roots which are not in S, we give some relations among all roots of polynomials f mod q j 's by providing an encoding function.
Before describing our solution, we look into an easy way to give a relation among all roots of polynomial f mod q j . However, it is not efficient to recover a set from a polynomial.
Encoding with a tag. To give relations among all roots of polynomials f mod q i 's, we may consider to insert the same value depending on the element, called a tag, into an element part in Z q j 's. For example, let h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 3(1−α)τ be a collision-resistant hash function for a real number 0 < α < 1. Parse s i into¯ blocks s i,1 , . . . , s i,¯ of (3ατ )-bit so that
Then one can reduce the number of candidates by checking a tag h(s i ) when one gets all roots over Z q j 's. However, when a collision occurs, say h(s i ) = h(s j ) with s i = s j , one has to check the hash value of 2¯ elements which are possible combinations (s i,1 , s j,1 ), · · · , (s i,¯ , s j,¯ ). The probability 3 that at least one collision occur among d elements is lower bounded by
which is not negligible even for small α. Moreover, the expected computation becomes Ω(2¯ ), which is not a polynomial in d.
Our Polynomial Representation
Now, we present our polynomial representation for supporting to recover a set from the polynomial over Z σ represented by our suggestion. Take α = Encoding by repetition. Let h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 2τ and h j : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} τ be collisionresistant hash functions for 1 ≤ j ≤ . Parse a message s i ∈ U ⊆ {0, 1} τ into blocks s i,1 , . . . , s i, of τ -bit so that s i = s i,1 || · · · ||s i, . Let s i, +j = h j (s i ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ and parse h(s i ) into two blocks s i,¯ +1 and s i,¯ +2 of τ -bit. Let¯ = + . We define our encoding function ι : 
Decoding phase. Denote by s
Inductively, we also define (s ) (s
3 ) is linkable pair.
Fig. 2. Linkable Pairs
Let ι(s i ) and ι(s i ) be an element of the image of ι with s i = s i . We can easily check the following properties:
j+1 is always a linkable pair.
is given, we perform two phases to find the correct d roots of f (x). In the first stage, one computes all the roots {s
for each j. For each j sequentially from 1 to¯ − 1, we find all the linkable pairs among {s
j+1 } by checking whether the last (2τ )-bit of s After¯ steps, we obtain d number of linkable pairs of¯ -tuple, which is a candidate of roots of f and an element of a set. It includes the d elements corresponding to ι(s 1 ), . . . , ι(s d ). If d is much larger than d, it can be a burden. However, we can show that the expected value of d is at most 3d in Theorem 1.
After obtaining d linkable pairs of¯ -tuple, in the second phase, we check whether each pair belongs in the image of ι with the following equalities:
The linkable pairs of¯ -tuple, corresponding to ι(s i ) for some i clearly satisfies the above equations. However, for a random¯ -tuple in Z q 1 × · · · × Z q¯ , the probability that it satisfies the relation (1) is about 1 2 τ and the probability that it satisfies the relation (2) is about 1 2 2τ . Hence, the expected number of wrong¯ -tuples passing both phases is less
. It is less than 2 −λ for a security parameter λ if we take the parameter to satisfy
For example, when λ = 80 and d ≈ d 0 ≈ 2 10 , then is about 8.
The Expected Number of Linkable Pairs
In this subsection, we analyze the expected number of linkable pairs of¯ -tuple when we recover a set from a polynomial of degree d, represented by our suggestion.
A set of κ elements s
j ∈ Z q j is called a κ-collision if their last 2τ -bits are the same. Since (s
j ) is a linkable pair, κ-collision causes at least κ linkable pairs. We easily obtain the following observations, which are evidence of the expected number of linkable pairs of¯ -tuple is not large.
1. The probability that at least one 2-collision occurs in Z q j is less than 1 2 by the birthday paradox. 2. The probability that at least one κ-collision occurs for κ ≥ 3 in Z q j is at most 1 4d ≈ 1 2 (2+τ ) of the probability that at least one (κ − 1)-collision occurs from [27, Theorem 2]. 3. If κ-collision occurs in Z q j , the number of candidates of roots of f is to be κ 2 from this collision. (Assume that κ-collision {s
can be combined with κ candidates {s
The expected number of 2-collision in Z q j for all j are roughly¯ 2 and the expected number of κ-collision in Z q j for κ ≥ 3 is negligible. Also, the expected number of linkable pairs of¯ -tuple is to be less than 
is given, the expected number of linkable pairs of¯ -tuple is at most 3d.
Proof. Let E j be the expected number of linkable pairs of j-tuple in Z q 1 × · · · × Z q j for j ≥ 2.
Then,
2 ) is a linkable pair = Pr (s
2 ) is a linkable pair and
If i j+1 = i j−1 and (s
j ) is a linkable pair and s i j ,j+1 ||s i j ,j+2 = s i j+1 ,j+1 ||s i j+1 ,j+2
Also,
From the above equations, we obtain the recurrence formula of E j as follows:
) is a linkable pair and i j = i j+1 .
) is a linkable pair and i j = i j+1
) is a linkable pair and
where e ≈ 2.718 is the base of the natural logarithm. From these result, the upper bound of the expected number of linkable pairs of¯ -tuple is 3d.
The proper size of α
In this subsection, we explain why the proper size of α is 
For each message s i = s i,1 || · · · ||s i, , denote by s
is given, one computes all the roots {s
j } over Z q j . Then, for each j sequentially from 1 to¯ −1, we find all linkable pairs among {s
We generalize the definition of linkable pair and look into some properties of linkable elements for the all case of α. We define (s
j+1 . Inductively, we also define (s 
Pr (s
for the encording funcion ι, the expected number of linkable pairs of¯ -tuple is at most d 1 + Proof. The expected number of linkable pairs of¯ -tuple is
) is a linkable pair and i¯ = i¯ −1 + Pr (s
) is a linkable pair and i¯ = i¯ −1
) is a linkable pair
2 ) is a linkable pair
is exponentially increased.
Hence it requires the limitation of¯ so that¯ < 2 min{3ατ ,(2−3α)τ } . But, if α = 1 3 , then 3α, (2 − 3α) < 1 and so 2 min{3ατ ,(2−3α)τ } < min{d, log N 12τ } for increasing of d and log N . It causes the limitation of the size of universe since |U| ≤ 2 3ατ in the case α = 1 3 . From these reason, we use the size of U to {0, 1} τ i.e. α = 
Applications to Set Operations
In this section, we present our set union protocols based on our polynomial representation described in Section 3. Our construction exploits the NS AHE to encrypt a rational function whose denominator polynomial corresponds to a participant's set. For this, we generalize a reversed Laurent Series presented in [23] to work on Z σ with a composite σ, which is the domain of the NS scheme.
We also explain how to modify our polynomial representation for applying to construct multi-set union protocols and set intersection protocols in which decryptors are different from set contributors.
Transforming Our Representation into Rational Function using Reversed Laurent Series
To construct constant round privacy-preserving set union protocols, we adopt rational function representations presented in [23] . In the rational function representation, each participant P i represents his own set S i of elements as a rational function
where f S i := s j ∈S (x − s j ). It gives the relation
for random polynomials r i 's and some polynomial u. Then each participant tries to recover f (x) = lcm(f S 1 , . . . , f Sn ) from a polynomial F (x) = u lcm(f S 1 ,...,f Sn ) . To represent a set as a rational function, the authors in [23] exploit a reversed Laurent series (RLS). We briefly introduce a RLS. (Refer to [23] for details.)
For a positive integer q, a reversed Laurent series (RLS) over Z q is a singly infinite, formal sum of the form
We define the degree of f by m and denoted deg f . For a RLS f (x), given
and g = 0, we define the RLS representation of a rational function f /g by a reversed Laurent series of f /g.
When q is a prime, the RLS representation has the following property:
-The RLS representation for a given rational function is unique.
-Let f, g be polynomials in Z q [x] with deg f < deg g and g = 0. Then there exists an algorithm [23] to compute k(> deg g) high-order terms of the RLS representation of f /g. We describe this algorithm in Figure 3 . We denote the output of RationalToRLS algorithm which takes polynomials f, g and integer k by RationalToRLS(f, g, k). U (x) where U (x) = lcm(f S 1 (x), . . . , f Sn (x)). There is no algorithm to recover u (x) and
U (x) . However, from our polynomial representation, it only requires U (x) mod q j for each j, and we can obtain U (x) mod q j from the RLS representation modulo q j by running polynomial recovering algorithm on Z q j [x]'s.
The following lemma guarantees that, in a polynomial ring Z σ [x], a modular operation by a prime divisor q of σ and RationalToRLS algorithm are commutative. This will be utilized to prove the correctness of our protocol. 
, where R q = 0 or deg R q ≤ deg R < deg g = deg g q . Since the division algorithm uniquely outputs the quotient and the remainder in
The following lemma gives an information on the distribution of u j (x) := u(x) mod q j in our protocol which is inevitable to prove the security of our set union protocol. It guarantees that the distribution of u j (x) and u(x) are uniformly distributed among polynomials in the set of polynomials having degree at most deg
, respectively. The proof of Lemma 3 is given in [23] .
be polynomials of degree k ≥ 1 for a prime q. Suppose r 1 (x), . . ., r n (x) are polynomials in Z q [x], chosen uniformly and randomly in the set of polynomials of degree at most k − 1. Let u(x) be a polynomial such that
Then u(x) is uniformly distributed among polynomials in the set of polynomials ∈ Z q [x] having degree at most deg(lcm(f S 1 (x), . . . , f Sn (x))) − 1.
Finally, to recover the exact U (x) = lcm(f S 1 , . . . , f Sn ) from the rational function
U (x) , the relation gcd(u(x), U (x)) = 1 is to be satisfied. In our set union protocol, since
Input: There are n ≥ 2 HBC participants Pi with a private input set Si ⊆ U of cardinality k. Set d = nk. Let Enc pk be a threshold NS encryption scheme. Let ι : {0, 1} * → Zσ be our encoding function defined in Section 3.
Each participant Pi,i = 1, . . . , n:
(a) constructs the polynomial fS
, defines 
, using the high-order 2nk terms of F (x) obtained in Step 3 (b). (b) extracts all roots of Uj(x) in Zq j [x] for all j using a factorization algorithm. (c) determines the set union using our rule of representation. 
and the expected number of roots of a random polynomial is one [17] , we may expect that our RLS representation fails to output all the elements in the set union with probability
be detected if this happens for a certain j, whose probability is about 1
It is not negligible, but small enough.
Set Union for Honest-But-Curious Case
Threshold Naccache-Stern Encryption For a group decryption, it requires a semantically secure, threshold NS additive homomorphic encryption scheme in our protocol. We provide a threshold version of the NS encryption scheme in Appendix A. Our construction is based on the technique of Fouque et al. [7] , which transforms the original Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme into a threshold version working from Shoup's technique [25] .
Parameter Setting Let U be the universe, n be the number of participants, and k be the maximum size of participants' datasets. Let d be the maximum size of the set union, i.e., d = nk. Take N so that log N > 12 log |U|, which is the modulus of threshold NS encryption scheme. Put d 0 = max{d, log N } and τ = 1 3 (log d + 2 log d 0 ). Set so that > log |U|/τ and a proper so that satisfies the relation (3). Let¯ = + . Note that¯ is to be smaller than min{d, log N 4 log log N }. Generate the parameters of the threshold NS encryption scheme, including the size of message space σ, which is a product of¯ (3τ + 1)-bit distinct primes q i 's.
Our Set Union Protocol for Honest-But-Curious Case Our set union protocol against honest-but-curious adversaries is described in Figure 4 . In our set union protocol, each participant computes the higher-order 2nk term of the RLS representation of
for our encoding function ι and sends its encryption to all others. After interactions among participants, each participant obtains the high-order 2nk term of the RLS representation of
for some random polynomials r i,j 's chosen by each participant P i . Then each participant obtains the high-order 2nk terms of the RLS representation of F in Z σ [x] with group decryption and using this values, recover polynomials u j (x) and U j (x) such that
. Thereafter, each participant extracts all roots of U j (x) over Z q j for each j and recover all elements based on criteria of our representation.
Analysis Now, we consider the correctness and privacy of our proposed protocol describe in Figure 4 . The following theorems guarantee the correctness and privacy of our construction in Figure 4 .
Theorem 3. In the protocol described in Figure 4 , every participants learn the set union of private inputs participating players, with high probability.
Proof. After Step 3 (b), all participants obtain the high order 2nk terms of F (x) and hence they obtain the high order 2nk terms of the RLS representation of F (x) mod q j . From these values, using polynomial recovering algorithm, they reconstruct polynomials u j (x) and U j (x) such that
U j (x) ≡ F j (x) mod q j , and gcd(u j (x), U j (x)) = 1. From the equation (4) and Lemma 2, U j = (lcm(f S 1 , f S 2 , . . . , f Sn ) mod q j ) with high probability. Since our polynomial representation can give the exact corresponded set with overwhelming probability, it gives S 1 ∪ . . . ∪ S n .
Theorem 4.
Assume that the utilized additive homomorphic encryption scheme is semantically secure. Then, in our set union protocol for the HBC case described in Figure 4 , any adversaries A of colluding fewer than n honest-but-curious participants learns no more information than would be gained by using the same private inputs in the ideal model with a trusted third party.
Proof. Since the utilized additive homomorphic encryption scheme is semantically secure, each participant learns only
. All players contribute to generate the polynomial ( n i=1 r i,j (x)) and the polynomial n i=1 r i,j (x) is uniformly distributed and unknown. Moreover, the resulting polynomials u j (x) are uniformly distributed by Lemma 3. Hence, no information can be recovered from the polynomial F , U j 's and u j 's, other than that given by revealing the union set.
Performance Analysis It is clear that our protocol runs in O(1) rounds. Let us count the computational and communicational costs for each participant.
Step 1 (a): requiresÕ(k) multiplications in Z σ for polynomial expansion of degree k and O(kd) multiplications to compute F S i . Step 4 (a): requires O(d 2 ) multiplications in Z q j to recover U j (x) using extended Euclidean algorithm for each j. 
Set Union for Malicious Case
Zero-knowledge Proofs We exploit the following zero-knowledge proofs for the malicious adversary model. We can efficiently construct the above zero-knowledge proofs for the NS encryption scheme by applying some standard techniques [3, 4] . We briefly introduce how to construct the following zero-knowledge proofs.
this is a zero-knowledge proof that
) is an encryption of f (x)g(x) when polynomial encryptions E pk (g(x)), E pk (f (x)) and E pk (f (x) · g(x)) are given. In this case, the prover knows only g(x), not f (x). We obtain this protocol by generalizing zero-knowledge proof of correct multiplication which proves Enc pk (c) is an encryption of ab, when Enc pk (a) and Enc pk (b) are given for an AHE Enc pk . This protocol requires O(nk 2 ) exponentiations for computation and O(nk 2 ) (log N )-bit elements for communication when f (x) is a polynomial of degree 2nk and g(x) is a polynomial of degree k.
this is a zero-knowledge proof that g(x) is the RLS representation of 1/f (x) when encryptions of f (x) and g(x) are given. By the Lemma 2 in [23] , if f (x) and
is the RLS representation of a rational function 1/f (x). Hence it is enough to prove that the higher-order deg(g(x)) + 1 coefficient of f (x)g(x) are equal to 1, 0, . . . , 0. To prove this, the prover first gives E pk (f (x) · g(x)) with zero-knowledge proof
(In this case, the prover also knows f (x), but the protocol is the same.) Then, using zero-knowledge protocols that a ciphertext is an encryption of 0 and a ciphertext is an encryption of 1, the prover proves that the encryption of the higher-order deg g + 1 of E pk (f (x) · g(x)) are encryption of 1, 0, . . . , 0. It requires O(nk 2 ) exponentiations and O(nk 2 ) (log N )-bit elements for communications when f (x) is a polynomial of degree k and g(x) is a polynomial of degree 2nk.
Commitment Scheme We also exploit some equivocal commitment schemes [14, 18] so that the simulator in the malicious adversary model can open the envelope to arbitrary value without being detected by the adversary.
Our Set Union Protocol for Malicious Case We give a PPSU-MAL protocol which is secure against malicious adversaries in Figure 5 and trapdoor commitment of Λ(r α,j ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. 3. The simulator S extracts f Sα from ZKPK[f Sα , F Sα ] and trapdoor commitments to Λ(r α,j ) to obtain a polynomial F α and polynomials r α,j for all α ∈ A. 4. The simulator S submits all roots to TTP and return the set union. 5. The simulator prepare to reveal the set union:
(a) computes U (x) =:
and compute the high-order 2nk RLS representation F (x) of a rational function
6. The simulator S follows the rest of the protocol as described and he opens the trapdoor commitment to reveal an appropriate Λ(r i,j ) for the new chosen polynomial r i,j . Then the participants calculate an encryption of the polynomial U chosen by the simulator S, and then decrypt it and hence learn the union set.
Note that the colluding players A cannot distinguish that the simulator S is in the real world or not and all players obtain the correct answer in both the real world and ideal world.
Extend to Multi-set Union Protocol
We can easily extend our set union protocol to a multi-set union protocol by modifying our encoding function. Assume that each participant P i has a multi-set S i ⊆ U for the known universe U ⊆ {0, 1} τ . Define a function η : U → U ⊆ {0, 1} τ ( + ) by η(s) = s||r where r is a randomly chosen element in {0, 1} τ . Then each participant takes part in our set union protocol with a set {η(s 1 ), . . . , η(s k )} as his set instead of {s 1 , . . . , s k }.
For the same messages s 1 and s 2 , if η(s 1 ) is different from η(s 2 ), one can obtain η(s 1 ) and η(s 2 ) as a part of a set union, so the frequency of s 1 in the union can be revealed. Hence, if all values of η are distinct, we can learn multi-set union. Consider the probability that there exist at least two same values among d values of function η. Then this probability is 1
and it is less Both computational and communicational complexities of our multi-set union protocol are the same with those of our set union protocol as big-O notation. However, it is more heavy than the previous best result [12] , which requires O(n 2 k) exponentiations in F q and O(n 2 k log q) bits where q is the similar size of the size of the universe. However, the public key size of our protocol is O(1) elements, while that of previous result is O(d) elements for the size d of multi-set union since their construction utilized El Gamal encryption schemes defined over an extension field F p d of extension degree d.
Set Intersection Protocol
In most private set intersection protocols based on polynomial representation and AHE schemes, it is hard to factorize the resulting polynomial corresponding to the intersection of datasets. Hence, it is assumed that the decryptors who want to obtain the set intersection possess a set having the resulting set as a subset and evaluate at elements of his set to check whether each element is a root of the resulting polynomial. Our polynomial representation provides a private set intersection protocol in which the decryptors efficiently recover the resulting set without a superset of the resulting set.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a new representation of a set by a polynomial over Z σ , which can be efficiently inverted by finding all the linear factors of a polynomial whose root locates in the image of our encoding function, when the factorization of σ is public. Then we presented an efficient constant-round set union protocols, transforming our representation into a rational function and then combining it with threshold NS AHE scheme. We also extend our set union protocol to a multi-set union protocol by modifying our representation and consider the set intersection protocol in the case that decryptors do not posses a superset of the resulting set.
6. Choose vk randomly which generates of the cyclic group of squares in Z * N and let vk i = vk ∆sk i mod N where ∆ = n!. It outputs a public key pk = (N, g, σ, vk, {vk i } n i=1 , ∆) and a secret key sk i for each user P i .
-Enc(pk, m): this algorithm takes as input a public key pk and a message m. It chooses a random element x in Z N and outputs c = g m x σ mod N . -ShareDec(pk, i, sk i , c): this algorithm takes as an input a public key pk, an index 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a secret share sk i and a ciphertext c. Then it computes c i = c 2∆sk i along with its proof π c i of the equality of the discrete logarithm between (c 4 , c 2 i ) and (vk, vk ∆sk i ) and computes g i = g ∆sk i along with its proof π g i of the equality of the discrete logarithm between (g, g ∆sk i ) and (vk, vk ∆sk i ). The non-interactive version of the proof of the equality of the discrete logarithm can be easily obtained from [25] . It outputs (c i , π c i , g i , π g i ).
-Combine(pk, S, c, {c i } i∈S , {π c i } i∈S , {g i } i∈S , {π g i } i∈S ): this algorithm is executed by the combiner. It takes as an input a public key pk, an index set S, a ciphertext c, its decryption shares {c i } i∈S , corresponding proofs {π c i } i∈S , generator shares {g i } i∈S , and corresponding proofs {π g i } i∈S . Then it runs the following steps: it gives the correctness of our construction.
